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Ordinarily, the Supreme Court uses a two-tier test to decide equal protec-
tion cases.2 If the Court finds that the challenged state action infringes on a
fundamental rights or adversely affects a suspect class,4 it applies strict scru-
tiny.5 Statutes subjected to strict scrutiny almost always are invalidated.' If
neither a fundamental right nor a suspect class is involved, the Court employs
a rational basis test.7 Except in rare cases,8 the Court upholds legislation
against rational basis attacks.9
In Plyler v. Doe,10 however, the Court applied the nascent intermediate
standard, which demands that the challenged state action bear a substantial
relation to a substantial state interest." The Court held that the equal protec-
tion clause12 prohibited the State of Texas from denying free public education
to undocumented alien children. s The decision is important, aside from its
1. 457 U.S. 202 (1982).
2. E.g., San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 17 (1973).
3. In addition to the liberties explicitly guaranteed by the Bill of Rights, U.S. CONST.
amend. I-X, the Court has identified a variety of fundamental rights implicit in the Constitution.
See, e.g., Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978) (marriage); Moore v. City of E. Cleveland,
431 U.S. 494 (1977) (family life); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (abortion); Boddie v. Con-
necticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971) (divorce); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (travel);
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (contraception); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533
(1964) (voting in state elections); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (procreation);
Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (raising children); see generally Perry, Modern
Equal Protection: A Conceptualization and Appraisal, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 1023, 1074-83 (1979).
4. See, e.g., Strauder v. West Va., 100 U.S. 303 (1879) (race); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118
U.S. 356 (1886) (national origin); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971) (alienage).
5. To withstand strict scrutiny, the challenged legislation must advance a compelling gov-
ernmental interest by the least restrictive means. San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez,
411 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1973).
6. Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 319 (1976) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
7. Two definitions of this test have surfaced. Justice Brennan prefers an exacting formula,
demanding that "the challenged legislation . . . rationally further some legitimate governmental
interest." Department of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973) (Brennan, J.). Justice
Rehnquist favors a more deferential standard, which upholds legislation "if any state of facts
reasonably can be conceived that would sustain it." United States R.R. Retirement Bd. v. Fritz,
449 U.S. 166, 174 (1980) (Rehnquist, J.).
8. E.g., Department of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973).
9. Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. at 319 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
10. 457 U.S. 202 (1983) (5-4 decision).
11. E.g., Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718 (1982) (gender discrimina-
tion); Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978) (reverse racial discrimination);
Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S. 259 (1978) (state law disadvantaging illegitimate children).
12. "No state shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of
the laws." U.S. CONsr. amend. XIV, § 1.
13. Technically, persons who enter the United States without permission are subject to
1
Schumaker: Schumaker: Rethinking Equal Protection
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1984
1984] EQUAL PROTECTION 167
unprecedented substantive content, because the Court departed from tradi-
tional equal protection analysis and applied an intermediate standard of re-
view. Unfortunately, the Plyler majority does not convincingly explain why
such a standard was appropriate.1 4 Chief Justice Burger's dissenting view that
Plyler represents a result-oriented approach is technically correct;15 the case is
inconsistent with the two-tier equal protection model and recent precedent.
Ultimately, the decision can be evaluated as an exercise of the power of
judicial review in an extraordinary and compelling case. The thesis of this
Note is that the Plyer Court, guided by Justice Powell, acted properly in strik-
ing down an intentionally invidious statute without unduly expanding the pur-
view of the equal protection clause.
In 1975, Texas amended its education code to provide state funds to local
school districts for the exclusive benefit of children who are United States citi-
zens or legally admitted aliens.16 The revision also authorized local school
officials to charge undocumented children tuition or to exclude them from pub-
lic schools.17 The primary purpose of the revision was to deter illegal
immigration.18 .
In Doe v. Plyler,29 a class action was brought challenging the statute on
equal protection grounds. The Tyler, Texas school board had imposed a one
thousand dollar tuition fee on undocumented children.20 The families of the
deportation and criminal prosecution. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1252, 1325 (1982). Yet federal im-
migration laws are practically unenforceable; an estimated one million Mexicans illegally enter
the United States each year. 128 CONG. REc. S10615 (daily ed. Aug. 17, 1982) (remarks of Sen.
Domenici). The states are virtually powerless to regulate naturalization in view of Congress's con-
stitutional mandate to pre-empt the field. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4; see also The Chinese
Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. 581 (1889) (Congress has inherent power to regulate immigration). In
1983, the Senate passed a bill designed to curb illegal immigration. S. 529, 98th Cong., 1st Sess.,
129 CONG. REc. S6969-86 (daily ed. May 18, 1983). The bill proscribes knowing employment of
illegal aliens and grants permanent or temporary resident status to unlawful entrants who have
resided in this country for a prescribed period. A similar bill is pending before the House. H.R.
1510, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., 129 CONG. Rsc. H2104-05 (daily ed. April 18, 1983).
14. Justice Brennan, joined by Justice Stevens, wrote the plurality opinion. Justices Mar-
shall, Blackmun, and Powell each concurred separately.
15. 457 U.S. at 242 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (White, Rehnquist, O'Connor, JJ., joining).
16. TEx. EDUC. CODE ANN., § 21.031(a) (Vernon 1982).
17. Id. § 21.031(c).
18. In re Alien Children Educ. Litig., 501 F. Supp. 544, 578 n.84 (S.D. Tex. 1980) (inter-
preting legislative history), summarily aff'd, No. 80-1807 (5tl Cir. Feb. 23, 1981), affd, 457 U.S.
202 (1982). Employment is the primary incentive for illegal immigrants, see Nafziger, A Policy
Framework for Regulating the Flow of Undocumented Mexican Aliens into the United States, 56
OR. L. REv. 63, 86-87 (1977), and deleterious effects of their presence in the domestic labor
market are well documented. See, e.g., Rodino, The Impact of Illegal Immigration on the Ameri-
can Labor Market, 27 RUTGERs L. REv. 245 (1973). But see Wolin, Americans Turn Down
Many Jobs Vacated by Ouster of Aliens, Wall St. J., Dec. 6, 1982, at 1, col. 1.
19. 458 F. Supp. 569 (E.D. Tex. 1978), affid, 628 F.2d 448 (5th Cir. 1980), affd, 457
U.S. 202 (1982). A parallel class action to enjoin enforcement of the Texas statute was consoli-
dated with Doe v. Plyler for review by the Supreme Court. In re Alien Children Educ. Litig., 501
F. Supp. 544 (S.D. Tex. 1980), summarily affd, No. 80-1807 (5th Cir. Feb. 23, 1981), affd, 457
U.S. 202 (1982).
20. Doe v. Plyler, 458 F. Supp. at 572.
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named plaintiffs had resided in Tyler for between three and thirteen years.2"
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas emphasized
that the vast majority of the children affected by the statute "are or will be-
come permanent residents of this country.9 22
In discussing the applicable standard of review, the district court consid-
ered the history of exploitation encountered by illegal aliens in Texas.23 It ob-
served that the statute would inevitably create a permanent subclass of illiter-
ates within the state.2 ' The court decided, however, that it was unnecessary to
resolve whether undocumented children were a suspect class or whether educa-
tion was a fundamental right, because the Texas statute had no rational
basis. 25
Noting that the Texas legislature had taken no action to discourage em-
ployment of illegal aliens, the court rejected the argument that the statute was
a rational means of deterring illegal immigration.2 The court also rebuffed the
contention that the exclusion of undocumented children was reasonably related
to the State's interest in preserving public resources; 7 the enactment of the
statute was simply a callous attempt to cut costs at the expense of a group of
defenseless children.28 The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Cir-
21. Id. at 574.
22. Id. at 578. The district court in In re Alien Children found that illegal aliens generally
enjoy "de facto amnesty." 501 F. Supp. at 558-59.
23. Doe v. Plyler, 458 F. Supp. at 583; see also In re Alien Children, 501 F. Supp. at 570
(comparing illegal aliens to antebellum slaves); see generally Ortega, Plight of the Mexican Wet-
back, 58 A.B.A. J. 251 (1972); Salinas & Torres, The Undocumented Mexican Alien: A Legal,
Social, and Economic Analysis, 13 Hous. L. REv. 863 (1976).
24. Doe v. Plyler, 458 F. Supp. at 577; see also In re Alien Children, 501 F. Supp. at 562
n.34 (uneducated children remain unsocialized and unable to cope with society).
25. Doe v. Plyler, 458 F. Supp. at 485. In contrast, the district court in In re Alien Chil-
dren held that education is a fundamental right and applied strict scrutiny to strike down the
statute. 501 F. Supp. at 564. This variance demonstrates that the Supreme Court arguably could
have employed either of the two traditional standards of review and reached the same result.
26. Doe v. Plyler, 458 F. Supp. at 485. In De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351 (1976), the
Supreme Court upheld a California ban on employment of illegal aliens against the claim that
Congress's constitutional authority over naturalization precluded all state involvement. The Court
observed that the California statute was consistent with congressional efforts to remove the pri-
mary economic incentive for illegal immigration. Id. at 357-61. In Doe v. Plyler, the district court
found that the state's failure to proscribe employment of aliens undermined any earnest attempt to
assert an exclusionary motive. 458 F. Supp. at 485.
As a result of Texas lobbying pressure, federal immigration policy ensures that employment op-
portunities continue to attract unlawful entrants. In re Alien Children, 501 F. Supp. at 565. The
federal prohibition on harboring illegal aliens expressly provides that employment "shall not be
deemed to constitute harboring." 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a) (1982). In 1982, federal legislation which
would proscribe employment of illegal aliens passed the Senate, 80-19. S. 2222, 97th Cong., 2d
Sess., 128 CONG. REC. S10619-31 (daily ed. Aug. 17, 1982). Six of the eight senators from states
bordering Mexico voted against it. See 128 CONG. REc. at S10618-19; see also Chase, Growers
Rail Against Efforts to Stem Flow of Illegal Aliens, Wall St. J., Aug. 4, 1983, at I, col. 1;
Harwood, Congress's Bad Immigration Bill, Wall St. J., Sept. 17, 1982, at 28, col. 1.
27. Doe v. Plyler, 458 F. Supp. at 588-89.
28. "The expediency of the state's policy may have been influenced by two actualities:
children of illegal aliens have never before been afforded any judicial protection, and little political
uproar was likely to be raised on their behalf." Id. Compare Hernandez v. Houston Indep. School
Dist., 558 S.W.2d 121 (Tex. Civ. App. 1977), where the state court applied the rational basis test
3
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cuit affirmed the rational basis analysis, 2 9 and the State appealed to the
United States Supreme Court.
As a threshold issue, the Court considered whether the fourteenth amend-
ment's guarantee of equal protection extended to illegal aliens. The State
maintained that persons who unlawfully entered the country were beyond the
jurisdiction of the states for equal protection purposes.30 All nine Justices re-
jected this "outlaw theory," and held that any person who comes within the
physical boundaries of a state is due some form of equal protection.31 The
question, then, was not whether the plaintiffs deserved equal protection, but
the quality of protection to which they were entitled.
Four members of the Plyler majority-Justices Brennan, Stevens, Mar-
shall, and Blackmun-deemed it proper to wield a substantive equal protection
clause.3 2 These four Justices applied an intermediate standard of review in
name only;33 they all indicated that education is a fundamental right, the dep-
rivation of which deserves strict scrutiny. These Justices apparently felt com-
pelled to apply a lesser standard in order to accommodate Justice Powell.4
The plurality opinion of Justice Brennan, joined by Justice Stevens, ini-
tially acknowledged the holding in San Antonio Independent School District v.
Rodriguezs5 that public education is not a fundamental right.36 Undaunted,
the plurality proceeded to describe the "fundamental role" of public schools in
our society.37 Justice Brennan observed that education was crucial to aid the
plaintiffs in their escape from poverty, just as it is crucial to any child who
reasonably expects to succeed.38 The plurality concluded that the confluence of
the right deprived and the disadvantaged social status of the plaintiffs required
invalidation of the Texas statute.39
Justice Marshall delivered a curt concurrence and offered no pretense of
relying on precedent, as he reiterated his view that "an individual's interest in
education is fundamental. '4° Justice Blackmun also concurred separately.41
and upheld the statute. The Texas tribunal concluded that an undocumented child is not entitled
to the equal protection of the laws because his presence in the country is unlawful. Id. at 124.
29. 628 F.2d at 454-58.
30. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. at 210-11; see Hernandez v. Houston Indep. School Dist., 558
S.W.2d at 124.
31. 457 U.S. at 215; id. at 243 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
32. Cf. Lupu, Untangling the Strands of the Fourteenth Amendment, 77 MICH. L. REv.
981, 1060-70 (1979) (substantive equal protection involves enforcement of Court's value
judgments).
33. 457 U.S. at 218 n.16.
34. See id.
35. 411 U.S. 1, 35 (1973).
36. 457 U.S. at 221.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 222 n.20, 223 (citing Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 489 (1954) (free
public education "is a right which must be made available to all on equal terms")).
39. 457 U.S. at 223-24.
40. Id. at 230 (Marshall, J., concurring); see Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 70-133 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting). Justice Marshall had argued the case against segregated school facilities in Brown.
41. 457 U.S. at 231 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
19841
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He agreed with Justice Marshall that the character of the interest at stake
was dispositive, and attempted to reconcile Plyler with precedent by making
two points. First, Justice Blackmun distinguished Rodriguez as involving only
a relative deprivation of educational quality.42 Second, he suggested a prece-
dent for the right to education by drawing an analogy to voting rights.48 De-
spite its lack of textual foundation in the Constitution, the Court has deemed
the right to vote fundamental because it affords individuals an opportunity to
participate in the political process. 4' Justice Blackmun reasoned that education
is fundamental because it affords individuals an opportunity to participate and
advance in society.45 This reasoning is tenuous.' 6 Nevertheless, Justice Black-
mun indicated that but for the Court's invocation of the intermediate stan-
dard, it would have been appropriate to examine the Texas statute with strict
scrutiny.47
In the final analysis, the standard of review applied by the Brennan bloc4s
is unimportant. These four Justices suggested that the Texas statute was sim-
ply unconscionable.49 Their conclusion derived not from judicial analysis, but
from a shared judicial philosophy. At the center of their jurisprudence stands
the notion of a "Living Constitution," the idea that the law of the land must
be responsive to the changing needs of society and, in particular, to the frus-
42. Id. at 235. Rodriguez involved an equal protection attack on the Texas public school
funding system, which relied on local school districts to supplement state funds with property tax
revenues. The Court held that the system did not violate the equal protection clause, even though
it resulted in lower per pupil expenditures in poorer school districts. 411 U.S. at 59.
43. 457 U.S. at 234.
44. Id.; see Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972) (invalidated one-year voter registra-
tion residency requirement); Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) (invali-
dated poll tax); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964) (mandated "one person one vote" state
legislative apportionment).
45. 457 U.S. at 234.
46. Justice Blackmun's analogy has three flaws. First, the plaintiffs in the voting rights
cases were citizens, not illegal aliens. The notion that a citizen's right to equal representation is
implicit in the Constitution does not support the conclusion that the document also guarantees
unlawful entrants opportunities to advance in society. Second, the analogy fails to account for the
Court's past requirement of absolute equality at the ballot box but not at the schoolhouse. Finally,
it is difficult to distinguish education from food, shelter, and health care as a necessary precondi-
tion to exercising opportunity. The Court has refused to recognize any of these important interests
as fundamental. See, e.g., Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535, 546-47 (1972) (no fundamental
right to welfare payments). In Plyler, Justice Blackmun attempted to characterize education as a
"means" and these other basic necessities as "ends." 457 U.S. at 234 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
Intuitively, this distinction seems viable. On closer inspection, however, the characterization may
be reversed: a child cannot learn if he is ill or unfed.
47. 457 U.S. at 235 n.3.
48. Although categorizing Justices Brennan, Stevens, Marshall, and Blackmun as a bloc is
an oversimplification, in the present context the label is accurate and useful.
49. See Plyler, 457 U.S. at 218-19 (Brennan, J.).
This situation raises the specter of a permanent class of undocumented resident aliens,
encouraged by some to remain here as a source of cheap labor, but nevertheless denied
the benefits that our society makes available to citizens and lawful residents. The exis-
tence of such an underclass presents most difficult problems for a Nation that prides
itself on adherence to principles of equality under the law.
5
Schumaker: Schumaker: Rethinking Equal Protection
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1984
EQUAL PROTECTION
trated aspirations of society's victims.50
This philosophy, which rose to prominence under the Warren Court, oper-
ates on two premises. First, the Constitution vests broad authority in the Court
to divine fundamental values"1 and to enact these values as constitutional
norms through the fourteenth amendment. 52 The leading exercise of this au-
thority was Roe v. Wade,58 where Justice Blackmun declared that the Consti-
tution protects a women's right to terminate her pregnancy." Similarly, in
Plyler, the Brennan bloc identified basic educational opportunity as a constitu-
tionally protected right. That the right to education has no explicit textual
source in the Constitution is insignificant; the Living Constitution mandates
that the right be recognized and enforced. 55
The second premise is based in the belief that the federal courts should
actively assist the advancement of disadvantaged minorities.56 Implicit in this
belief is the identification of "equality" as a constitutional norm.57 Accord-
ingly, Justices Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens have given special
consideration to racial minorities, 58 social reformers,59 state prisoners,60 indi-
gents, 61 legal aliens,6 2 and now, undocumented children.
50. See Brennan, Justice Thurgood Marshall: Advocate for Human Need in American
Jurisprudence, 40 MD. L. REV. 390, 391 (1981).
51. See Ely, The Supreme Court, 1977 Term-Foreward: On Discovering Fundamental
Values, 92 HARv. L. REV. 5, 5-8 (1978).
52. This approach is treacherous. The intractable problem lies in determining which values
are sufficiently important to be vindicated by unelected judges over contrary legislative judgments.
See generally A. BICKEL, THE LEAsT DANGEROUS BRANCH (1962). For example, in Lochner v.
New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), the Court invalidated maximum-hour legislation because it in-
fringed on the fundamental freedom to contract. Beginning with Lochner, the Court embarked on
an era of enforcing its laissez faire economic philosophy through judicial review. Lochner and its
progeny have been universally discredited. See, e.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483
(1955). This criticism stands today as a strong admonition against judicial enforcement of unwrit-
ten fundamental values.
53. 410 U.S. 113 (1973); see generally Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf. A Comment on
Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 920 (1973).
54. 410 U.S. at 153; see also Harris v. McCrae, 448 U.S. 297, 329-57 (1980) (Brennan,
Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens, JJ., dissenting) (Constitution requires the federal government
to subsidize abortions for the poor).
55. Justice Blackmun "predicted" the result in Plyler before the action was even filed: "I
see the increasing awareness and recognition of equality of educational opportunity. We have been
at this, theoretically, for over twenty years now but we're a long way from being through with it."
H. Blackmun, Address at Dedicatory Proceedings for the Waterman Hall Addition (April 7,
1976), reprinted in 30 ARK. L. REv. ix, xviii (1976).
56. See Brennan, State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 HARV.
L. REV. 489, 491 (1977).
57. See Matthews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 516 (1976) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
58. See, e.g., City of Port Arthur v. United States, 457 U.S. 922 (1982); Columbus Bd. of
Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449 (1979).
59. See, e.g., Brown v. Socialists Workers '74 Campaign Comm., 103 S. Ct. 416 (1982);
Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 519 (1975) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
60. See. e.g., Smith v. Wade, 103 S. Ct. 1625, 1640 (1983); Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S.
90, 105 (1980) (Blackmun, J., dissenting); Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 821 (1977).
61. See, e.g., Harris v. McCrae, 448 U.S. 297, 329-57 (1982) (Brennan & Marshall, JJ.,
dissenting); Department of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973).
62. See, e.g., Ambach v. Norwich, 441 U.S. 68, 84 (1979) (Blackmun, J., dissenting);
Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 376 (1971).
1984]
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In contrast, the Burger bloeA--the Chief Justice, joined by Justices
White, Rehnquist, and O'Connor--dissented in Plyler and denied that the
Constitution entitled undocumented children to free public education. 6 4 Rely-
ing on San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez,65 Chief Justice
Burger concluded that education is not a fundamental right.0 6 The Chief Jus-
tice also asserted that the Plyler plaintiffs were not members of a suspect
class, for their disfavored status stemmed solely from their violation of federal
immigration laws.67 In the absence of a fundamental right or suspect class, the
dissenters applied the deferential rational basis test and determined that the
Texas statute was constitutionally sound.68
The disparate conclusions of the plurality and dissenting opinions derive
from basic philosophical differences. 69 Three elements define the Burger bloc's
jurisprudence. First, these Justices emphasize the democratic principles em-
bodied in the Constitution."0 Once elected representatives have addressed an
63. Again, this designation is an oversimplification. Justice White, for example, often does
not follow the views of his colleagues. See, e.g., Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922 (1982)
(Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, & Stevens, JJ. joining). Despite his gravitation to the conserva-
tive side of the Court, he remains sensitive to charges of racial discrimination. See City of Port
Arthur v. United States, 457 U.S. 932 (1982). In her first Term on the Court, Justice O'Connor
demonstrated a unique constitutional perspective. Although ordinarily deferential to the state, she
was vigilant in the area of gender discrimination. See, e.g., Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Ho-
gan, 458 U.S. 718 (1982).
64. 457 U.S. at 242 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
65. Id. at 247; see 411 U.S. at 18.
66. 457 U.S. at 247-48.
67. Id. at 245 n.5, 246.
68. Id. at 248-53. The Chief Justice accurately characterized the reasoning of the Plyer
majority as "unabashedly result-oriented." Id. at 244. A literal reading of precedent supports the
dissenting view that neither the peculiar situation of the plaintiffs nor the relative importance of
the individuals' interest in state benefits should determine the outcome of constitutional adjudica-
tion. See Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 30; see also Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 324-25 (1982)
(courts should defer to states concerning the quality of treatment due institutionalized retarded
persons); Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 97 (1979) (rational basis test applied to age discrimina-
tion); Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535, 549 (1972) (rational basis test applied to welfare bene-
fits legislation); Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 74 (1972) (rational basis test applied to tenant
legislation); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485 (1970) (courts should defer even to legisla-
tive judgments that affect "the most basic needs of impoverished human beings"). The Chief
Justice pointed out in Plyler that the majority offered no meaningful distinction between educa-
tion and other essential government benefits. 457 U.S. at 247-48. Illegal aliens are currently ineli-
gible for most federal assistance. See 7 C.F.R. § 273.4 (1983) (food stamps); 42 C.F.R.
§ 435.402 (1982) (Medicaid); 45 C.F.R. § 233.50 (1982) (AFDC). The plurality never resolved
this dilemma. Justice Powell indicated, however, that denying other state benefits to undocu-
mented children would be impermissible. See note 95 infra. One distinction between state-pro-
vided education and federally funded programs is that only Congress has constitutional authority
to regulate immigration. Compare Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 792-96 (1977) (sustained federal
immigration legislation discriminating on basis of illegitimate birth) with Graham v. Richardson,
403 U.S. 365, 377-79 (1971) (invalidated state discrimination against legal aliens). Moreover,
there is a qualitative difference between education and other government benefits: public school
attendance is compulsory for all school-age children, while welfare recipients must meet stringent
eligibility requirements.
69. See generally Rehnquist, The Notion of a Living Constitution, 54 TEx. L. REv. 693
(1976).
70. According to Justice Rehnquist, it is Congress's prerogative, not the Court's, to recog-
nize fundamental civil rights. Id. at 700.
7
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issue, the Burger bloc is extremely reluctant to overrule their decision. 1 Un-
like the activists on the Warren Court, these Justices ordinarily decline to ex-
ercise their power on behalf of minority groups and social reformers. 2 Accord-
ingly, the present Court has restricted standing to sue the government,73
diminished the reach of "state action" in fourteenth amendment litigation,74
and limited the expansion of fundamental rights.7 5
The second element that defines the Burger bloc's judicial philosophy is a
strong sense of federalism.76 Federalism vests broad discretion in local govern-
ments and counsels against federal intervention in state affairs. This deference
is the keystone of Justice Rehnquist's constitutional perspective." Despite his
reputation as a strict constructionist, Justice Rehnquist has identified the
source of contemporary federalism in the opaque language of the tenth amend-
ment, 7 8 giving the states' rights doctrine constitutional dimensions.79
Justice Rehnquist also strongly adheres to the third element of the Burger
bloc's jurisprudence-positivism. Positivism theorizes that the applicable law
consists solely of man-made statutes and that statutory construction should be
governed by internal logic rather than external ethical considerations.8 In-
71. See, e.g., Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731 (1982) (President is absolutely immune
from civil damages prosecutions); United States R.R. Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166
(1980) (pension benefits legislation upheld as neither arbitrary nor irrational); Ambach v.
Norwick, 441 U.S. 68 (1979) (sustained state disqualification of legal aliens from teaching in
public schools).
72. See Brown v. Socialist Workers '74 Campaign Comm., 103 S. Ct. 416, 428-32
(O'Connor, J., dissenting) (state campaign contribution disclosure statute was not unconstitutional
as applied); Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church &
State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 487 (1982) (courts have no "special license" to correct government
wrongdoing); City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 70 (1980) (disproportionate effects insuffi-
cient to establish that voting scheme was racially invidious); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229,
246 (1976) (statistical evidence insufficient to establish that employment practices were racially
invidious); cf. United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 179 (1974) (constitutional challenge to
CIA budget secrecy rejected on standing grounds).
73. See, e.g., Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of
Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464 (1982).
74. See, e.g., Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991 (1982); Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S.
830 (1982).
75. See, e.g., Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980) (abortion); City of Mobile v. Bolden,
446 U.S. 55 (1980) (voting).
76. See generally O'Connor, Trends in the Relationship Between the Federal and State
Courts from the Perspective of a State Court Judge, 22 WM. & MARY L. RaV. 801 (1981).
Justice O'Connor proposes that state court judgments concerning the constitutionality of state
laws should be given great deference by the federal judiciary. She views state and federal courts
as equally competent to apply federal constitutional standards. But compare the decision of the
federal district court in Plyer with a state appellate decision upholding the Texas law. See note 27
supra. Two differences insure disparity in temperament between state and federal courts: state
court judges are popularly elected, while federal judges enjoy life tenure; and federal courts are
less likely to feel the institutional restraint of state legislatures. See cases cited at note 132 infra.
77. See National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
78. Id. at 842; see U.S. CONST. amend. X ("[Plowers not delegated to the United States
by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to
the people.").
79. Justice Brennan decried the breadth of the holding in Usery and found no precedent to
justify the result. 426 U.S. at 869 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
80. See J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 1-9 (1980).
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deed, Chief Justice Burger has said that the Couit's "duty . . . is not to do
justice, but to apply the law and hope that justice is done." 81 In Plyler, the
Burger bloc's perceived duty was to apply traditional equal protection analysis
and to uphold the state legislature's exercise of its police power; the apparent
injustice of the Texas statute was irrelevant."2
The philosophies underlying the plurality and dissenting opinions stand in
irreconcilable conflict.8 3 Judicial enforcement of unwritten fundamental rights
is anathema to positivism. An expansive reading of a Living Constitution is
incompatible with deference to state legislative processes. Yet, Justice Powell
is able to mediate between these two extremes with the wisdom of Solomon.8
In Plyler, Justice Powell succeeded at restraining the plurality's declaration of
a broad right to education while rescuing a group of defenseless children from
the caprice of a hostile legislature.
Justice Powell joined Justice Brennan's plurality opinion, but wrote sepa-
rately to neutralize its precedential value by emphasizing "the unique nature
of the case."8 Unlike the Brennan bloc, Justice Powell firmly indicated that
81. Bifulco v. United States, 447 U.S. 381, 402 (1980) (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
82. Chief Justice Burger granted that the Texas statute was "senseless." Plyler, 457 U.S.
at 242 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). This concession appears to contradict his later conclusion that
the legislation was rationally related to legitimate state interests. The Chief Justice reconciled
these positions by saying that his personal opinion was immaterial because "the solution to this
seemingly intractable problem is to defer to the political process, as unpalatable as that may be to
some." Id. at 254. Given the popular support in Texas for the law, the Chief Justice's solution
would not offer undocumented children much hope. See Doe v. Plyler, 458 F. Supp. at 589; Kane
& Valarde-Munoz, Undocumented Aliens and the Constituion: Limitations on State Action De-
nying Undocumented Children Access to Public Education, 5 HAsTINGs CoNsT. L.Q. 461, 461-65
(1978). Nor could the children find relief in Congress. Proposed legislation concerning undocu-
mented workers would not have affected the Texas law. See S. 2222, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., 128
CONG. REC. S10619-31 (daily ed. Aug. 17, 1982).
83. This observation seems to account for the commentators' unanimous criticism of the
Court's equal protection decisions. See, e.g., Blattner, The Supreme Court's "Intermediate"
Equal Protection Decisions: Five Imperfect Models of Constitutional Equality, 8 HASTINGS
CONsT. L.Q. 777, 826 (1981); Perry, supra note 3, at 1082; Seeburger, The Muddle of the Mid-
dle Tier, 48 Mo. L. REV. 587, 624-25 (1983); Wilkinson, The Supreme Court, the Equal Protec-
tion Clause, and the Three Faces of Constitutionality, 61 VA. L. RaV. 945, 978 (1975). The
commentators concur only in their criticism of the Court's inconsistency; they present no uniform
alternate doctrine. See, e.g., Perry, supra note 3, at 1025 (criticizing Professor Wilkinson's
article).
84. Two cases illustrate Justice Powell's influence on the development of equal protection
doctrine. In Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762 (1977) (5-4 decision) (Powell, J.), the Court held
unconstitutional an Illinois statute which absolutely barred intestate succession by an illegitimate
child to his father's estate. In Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S. 259 (1978) (5-4) (Powell, J.), the Court
upheld a New York statute which allowed an illegitimate to share in his intestate father's estate
only if paternity had been adjudicated prior to the father's death. Trimble was distinguished by
Justice Powell as involving a complete disinheritance. Lalli, 439 U.S. at 273. No other Justice
found the cases distinguishable. See generally Maltz, Portrait of a Man in the Middle-Mr.
Justice Powell, Equal Protection, and the Pure Classification Problem, 40 OHIO ST. L.J. 941
(1979).
85. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. at 236 (Powell, J., concurring). Justice Powell's hesitation is
important because of his key position on the Court. In Plyler, Justice Powell stated that a statute
which established a bona fide residency requirement for public school admission would not violate
equal protection. Id. at 240 n.4. The Court upheld such a statute during the next Term. In Marti-
nez v. Bynum, 103 S. Ct. 1838 (1983), the Court considered a facial challenge to a Texas statute
9
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education is not a fundamental right.8 6 He also stated that illegal aliens are
not a suspect class.87 Accordingly, Justice Powell maintained that the appro-
priate standard of review was not strict scrutiny, but the intermediate tier.88
Justice Powell's reluctance to identify expansive substantive rights or sus-
pect classes stems from his agreement with the second Justice Harlan that the
Court ought not sit as a "superlegislature."89 Justice Powell is particularly
unwilling to invalidate legislation enacted in the spirit of reform. 0 He departs
from the positivists on the present Court, however, in his belief that the
Court's tradition of restraint counsels caution in evaluating legislative judg-
ments, not blind acquiescence.9 1
Justice Powell has been especially suspicious of legislative classifications
which discriminate against illegitimate children.92 In Plyler, he compared the
plight of undocumented children to that of illegitimates.9 3 He explained that
neither group is accountable for its second-class status, yet both are singled
out and penalized for their parents' misconduct." The logical extension of this
analogy is that undocumented children, like illegitimate children, will be enti-
tled to intermediate judicial scrutiny in future cases.95
which denied public school admission to minors who live apart from their parents or guardians if
the primary motive for residing in the school district is to attend free public school. Finding that
the legislation was a bona fide residency requirement, the Court applied the rational basis test. Id.
at 1842 n.7. Justice Powell distinguished Plyler on the grounds that the legislation in Martinez
was facially neutral and applicable to all school-age children. Id. at 1842. Justice Brennan con-
curred, stressing that the case involved only a facial challenge. Id. at 1845 (Brennan, J., concur-
ring). Justice Marshall, relying on his Plyler concurrence, concluded that the statute impermissi-
bly interfered with the fundamental right to education. Id. at 1852 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
86. 457 U.S. at 238 n.2.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 35 (1973) (Powell, J.)
(quoting Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 661 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting)). In Frontiero v.
Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973), Justice Powell found that certain military regulations favoring
males violated equal protection, but wrote separately to disassociate himself from the "far reach-
ing implications" of Justice Brennan's plurality opinion holding that women constitute a suspect
class. "[D]emocratic institutions are weakened and confidence in the restraint of the Court is
impaired, when we appear unnecessarily to decide sensitive issues of broad social and political
importance." Id. at 692 (Powell, J., concurring).
90. In upholding the legislation in Rodriguez, Justice Powell noted that the Texas system
was implemented to extend and improve public education. 411 U.S. at 39. Similarly, in Lalli,
Justice Powell recognized that the New York statute was a reform of the common law policy of
imposing a total disability on illegitimates. 439 U.S. at 266.
91. See Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 502 (1977).
92. See Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 169 (1972).
93. 457 U.S. at 238 (Powell, J. concurring).
94. Id.
95. Justice Powell indicated that it would be impermissible for a state to deny welfare
benefits to an otherwise eligible undocumented child. Id. at 239 n.3. Justice Blackmun also
warned that undocumented children "may not be denied rights that are granted to citizens." Id. at
236 (Blackmun, J., concurring). Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens probably concur. See
notes 56-57 and accompanying text supra. Thus, undocumented children should be treated in the
future as a functionally suspect class. Justice Powell distinguished the status of the parents of
undocumented children, however, since mature aliens are accountable for their unlawful entry.
457 U.S. at 240 n.5 (Powell, J., concurring). This distinction creates the difficult task of differenti-
ating between parent and child with respect to public assistance programs like AFDC. In Ruiz v.
10
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Underlying Justice Powell's analogy are two related canons of justice: le-
gal burdens must be related to individual culpability,96 and individuals should
not be punished for their social inferiority." In Plyler, Justice Powell recog-
nized that the Texas statute burdened a class that had no control over its
illegal status. In addition, the jurist viewed the statute as a punitive measure
that was designed to subjugate a discrete class of childrenY8
Justice Powell announced a simple rule of distributive justice: "punitive
discrimination based on status . . . is impermissible under the Equal Protec-
tion Clause." 99 His approach focuses not on the substantive interests involved,
but on the dynamics of legislative classification. His role as a Justice is not to
impress value judgments upon legislative bodies, but to remedy malfunctions
in the lawmaking process.200 Justice Powell is a cautious guardian of the "lib-
erating spirit of the Equal Protection Clause." 101 Only in a rare case, such as
Plyler, will he wield the heightened power of judicial review by applying the
intermediate standard.
Unfortunately, Powell's definition of intermediate scrutiny-demanding a
substantial relation to a substantial governmental interest' 2-is too vague to
be analytically useful.' 03 Still, the standard served two important functions in
Blum, 549 F. Supp. 871 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) the court considered whether children of illegal aliens
may be denied federal day care benefits because of their parents' status. Unlike the children in
Plyler, the plaintiff children were United States citizens or lawful residents. Id. at 877. Construing
the Social Security Act, the court held that the children were eligbile. In dicta, the court stated
that the same result should be reached in AFDC cases. Id.; see also Holley v. Lavine, 464 F.
Supp. 718 (W.D.N.Y.) (undocumented alien mother who received official assurance that she
would not be deported while her citizen children remained dependent held eligible for AFDC),
affid, 605 F.2d 638 (2d Cir. 1979). But cf. Darces v. Woods 131 Cal. App. 3d 269, 182 Cal.
Rptr. 417 (1982) (state and federal laws that barred undocumented children from AFDC upheld
against equal protection challenge).
96. See Plyler, 457 U.S. at 238 (Powell, J., concurring); Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Sur.
Co., 406 U.S. 164, 175 (1972); cf. Perry, supra note 3, at 1050-58 (Court should adopt "moral
relevance" standard in equal protection cases).
97. See Plyler 457 U.S. at 238. Moral innocence and social stigma usually coalesce. See
note 84 supra. In Regents of the Univ. of Calif. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1979), however, these
factors were polarized. The university sought to aid minority applicants through a rigid quota
which denied admission to otherwise qualified whites. Justice Powell ruled in favor of the plaintiff,
reasoning that the equal protection clause protects innocent individuals from arbitrary state ac-
tion, as well as prohibiting government suppression of disadvantaged minorities. Id. at 291-300.
Plyer, on the other hand, involved a statute which ignored individual culpability and penalized a
traditionally disadvantaged group.
98. 457 U.S. at 238-39 (Powell, J., concurring); cf Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 28 (Powell, J.)
(Texas school funding system did not work to the peculiar disadvantage of any identifiable group).
99. 457 U.S. at 240 (Powell, J., concurring).
100. See J. ELY, supra note 80, at 136.
101. Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 741 (1982) (Powell, J., dissent-
ing). The male plaintiff in Hogan was denied admission to an all-female state nursing college.
Justice Powell dissented from the holding that the state's gender-based exclusion of the plaintiff
violated the equal protection clause, finding that Hogan was not a sex discrimination case. Id. at
745. It is doubtful that the male-dominated Missippi legislature intended to tyrannize Mississippi
men by maintaining a school exclusively for women.
102. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 239 (Powell, J., concurring).
103. "Substantial" yields exponential ambiguity when used twice in the same phrase. Jus-
tice Rehnquist has warned that whatever the Court's internal understanding, deviations from
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Plyler. It accommodated Justice Powell's dilemma, allowing him to invoke his
canons of justice without applying the hyperbolic strict scrutiny standard.
More importantly, it released the Court from the deferential rational basis
test, enabling it to supervise the state.104
Plyler notwithstanding, the traditional two tier analysis will continue to
be the dominant model for equal protection cases.105 The present Court is
committed to restraint, save in the most compelling circumstances.106 In deter-
mining when circumstances are sufficiently compelling, it is history, not analy-
sis, that provides the most able guide.107 Thus, the foundation of the Plyler
decision can be evaluated only by examining the Founding Fathers' conception
of the federal judiciary and appraising the Court's institutional role under the
equal protection clause.
The Founding Fathers established an independent federal judiciary with
the expectation that the courts would protect individuals from governmental
oppression. 108 Based on their colonial experience, these men knew that tyranny
breeds discontent and inevitably undermines support for the government.109
Consequently, they created a court system which could overrule the excesses
of the legislative branch without the fear of partisan reprisal.110
From the moment Chief Justice Marshall declared that it is "the province
traditional analysis inevitably confuse the lower courts. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 221 (1976)
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting). This concern is mitigated, however, if the two-tier analysis continues
to dominate equal protection doctrine. See note 105 infra.
104. Justice Rehnquist had criticized the "diaphanous and elastic" intermediate standard as
an unjustifiable affront to federalism and democratic decision-making. Craig, 429 U.S. at 221
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Even more elastic is Justice Marshall's sliding scale. See Massachu-
setts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 318 (1976) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
105. In Plyler, Justices Blackmun and Powell reaffirmed their beliefs that the intermediate
standard remains the exception rather than the rule. 457 U.S. at 232 (Blackmun, J., concurring);
id. at 238-39 (Powell, J., concurring). Justice Brennan would employ the intermediate standard
only "when concerns sufficiently absolute and enduring can be clearly ascertained from the Con-
stitution and our cases." Id. at 218 n.16; see also Martinez v. Bynum, 103 S. Ct. 1838, 1842-43
(1983) (Powell, J.) (bona fide residency requirement for public school admission sustained under
rational basis test); Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 31 (Powell, J.) (courts lack authority and competence
to assume a legislative role through use of varying standards); Craig, 429 U.S. at 210 n. (Powell,
J., concurring) (dissatisfaction with two-tier model does not justify further subdivision of equal
protection scrutiny). But cf J.W. v. City of Tacoma, 720 F.2d 1126 (9th Cir. 1983) (intermediate
standard applied to strike down zoning legislation disfavoring former mental patients).
106. See, e.g., Schweiker v. Wilson, 450 U.S. 221 (1981) (denying federal benefits to insti-
tutionalized mentally retarded persons sustained under rational basis test).
107. Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 n.12 (1977) (Powell, J.).
108. See THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 145 (A. Hamilton) (A. Hacker ed. 1964).
109. See id. at 148; see generally R. HOFSTADER, THE AMERICAN POLITICAL TRADITION 3-
21 (1974).
110. The federal judiciary's independence is protected by the guarantee of life tenure with
undiminished compensation. See U.S. CONsT. art. III, § 1. Hamilton felt that an appointed fed-
eral judiciary would provide the "essential barrier to the encroachments of the representative
body." THE FEDERALIST No. 78, supra note 107, at 148. United States District Judge William
Justice, who presided over Doe v. Plyler, commented nearly 200 years later that his politically
independent position made "all the difference." King, A Loner in the Lone Star
State-Conservative Texans Don't Hide Their Hate for Liberal Judge William Justice, Boston
Globe, Feb. 3, 1982, at 2, col. 2; see also note 76 supra.
1984]
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and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is," ' however, the
values of federalism and democracy have been at odds with the power of judi-
cial review. Although the Founding Fathers designed the federal courts to act
as a buffer between the people and the government, they did not intend for
unelected judges to rule the nation.11 2 Moreover, while the acts of the popu-
larly elected branches are subject to judicial review, the only effective check
on the Court's power is its sense of self-restraint.113 Commentators have of-
fered two considerations to circumscribe the Court's role.114 First, the Court's
interpretation of the Constitution must be consistent with the document's text
and design. Second, the Court must offer an explanation for its authority to
override majority rule. It is in relation to these two criteria that Plyler v. Doe
must be measured.
Before 1868, the Court's review of state laws was limited because the Bill
of Rights did not apply to the states." 5 The ratification of the fourteenth
amendment, however, forever changed the face of federalism. Since its incep-
tion, the equal protection clause has suffered two competing interpretations.
First, in the Slaughter-House Cases,"" a bare majority of the Court held that
the equal protection clause prohibits only racial discrimination.117 The Court
pointed out that the clause was originally proposed in response to the black
codes enacted by southern states after the Civil War. 8 The second traditional
interpretation of the equal protection clause was announced by the Slaughter-
House dissenters.119 They recognized that the immediate purpose of the clause
was to guarantee racial equality, but maintained that the Civil War amend-
ments signalled a radical shift away from the states' sovereign independence
and toward the national government's preeminence.1 20
The debate subsided as the equal protection clause was "strangled in in-
111. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
112. Popular control of government is the cornerstone of the Constitution. See U.S. CoNsT.
art. I, § 2, cl. 1; art. I, § 3, cl. 1; art. II, § 1, cl. 2; see also THE FEDERALIST No. 39 (J.
Madison) (federalism); id. No. 48 (J. Madison) (separation of powers).
113. United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 78-79 (1936) (Stone, J., dissenting).
114. See J. ELY, supra note 80, at 11-41; Blattner, supra note 83, at 802; see also
Auerbach, The Unconstitutionality of Congressional Proposals to Limit the Jurisdiction of the
Federal Courts, 47 Mo. L. REV. 47, 51 (1982).
115. See Barron v. Mayor of Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833).
116. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873) (5-4 decision).
117. Id. at 81. Justice Rehnquist agrees with this narrow construction of the equal protec-
tion clause. See Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 778 (1978) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). He feels
that any expansion of the equal protection clause beyond race should be left to Congress under
§ 5 of the fourteenth amendment. See Rehnquist, supra note 69, at 700; see also Pennhurst State
School v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 16 (1981) (Rehnquist, J.) (if Congress did not express its intent
to legislate under § 5, law cannot be considered an enforcement provision of the equal protection
clause).
118. The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 81; see also C. VANN WOODWARD,
THE STRANGE CAREER OF JIM CROW 23 (3d ed. 1974).
119. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 83-130 (Chase, C.J., Field, Bradley, & Swayne, JJ., dissenting).
120. Id. at 110 (Field, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan similarly views the equal protection
clause as "an elementary limitation on state power." Plyler, 457 U.S. at 213.
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fancy by post-civil-war judicial reactionism." ' l l The promise of human dignity
pursued during the First Reconstruction was revoked as the nation capitulated
to southern racism.122 The clause remained dormant for over fifty years. Grad-
ually, in view of the Nazis' rise to power in Germany, the Court began to
appreciate the importance of the power entrusted to it by the Framers of the
fourteenth amendment. In 1938, Justice Stone suggested that the Court would
begin to exercise a stronger role in protecting politically powerless minorities
from legislative tyranny.1 23 After the Second World War ended and the atroc-
ities committed under German positive law came to light, 2" the Court under-
stood that its duty was not simply to apply the law as written by the majority.
Instead, its duty was to ensure that the law treated no one unjustly. 25 In
Brown v. Board of Education,'26 this understanding came to fruition.
It is generally agreed that Brown marked the beginning of the modern era
for the equal protection clause 27 as well as the inception of the Second Recon-
struction.122  After Brown, the Court boldly asserted its power to invalidate
racially discriminatory legislation. 29 It began to interpret the open-ended lan-
guage of the equal protection clause as a general mandate to strike down op-
pressive state laws and practices.' 30 Although the Burger Court has checked
the expansion of equal protection doctrine,' 3' eight Justices continue to favor a
generalist construction of the clause that allows anyone to invoke its applica-
121. Tussman & tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CALIF. L. REV. 341, 381
(1949).
122. See, e.g., Williams v. Mississippi, 170 U.S. 213 (1898) (disenfranchisement of blacks
does not violate equal protection); Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896) (separate but equal
doctrine); see generally C. VANN WOODWARD, supra note 118, at 67-111.
123. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938). "[P]rejudice
against discrete and insular minorities may be a special condition, which tends seriously to curtail
the operation of those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities, and
which may call for a correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry." Id.
124. See generally B. BETTELHEIM, THE INFORMED HEART (1960) (dehumanizing effects of
absolute adherence to positive law in Nazi Germany). The Nazis were the ultimate positivists.
Citizens were duty-bound to obey government required acts of genocide. Moral considerations
were irrelevant. Positivist thought also dominated the German legal community, encouraging
"German lawyers to stand by at Nazi barbarism, declaring, 'Gesetz ist Gesetz' (Law is Law)." 10
ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITTANICA Legal Profession 914, 920 (15th ed. 1982).
125. See Railway Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 112-13 (1949) (Jackson, J.,
concurring) ("[T]here is no more effective practical guarantee against arbitrary and unreasonable
government than to require that the principles of law which officials would impose upon a minority
must be imposed generally."). Justice Jackson presided over the Nuremberg trials.
126. 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (unanimous decision) (overruling separate but equal doctrine).
127. See Wilkinson, supra note 83, at 987.
128. See generally C. VAN WOODWARD, supra note 118, at 1146-88.
129. See Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967); Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339
(1960); see also Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958) (unanimous Court reaffirmed Marbury and
rejected claim that Brown was unenforceable).
130. See, e.g., Glona v. American Guar. & Liab. Ins. Co., 391 U.S. 73 (1968) (initiated
judicial protection of illegitimate children); Harper v. Virginia State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S.
663 (1966) (struck down poll tax); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963) (mandated ap-
pointed counsel for indigent criminal defendants taking state appeals); see also Reed v. Reed, 404
U.S. 71 (1971) (initiated heightened judicial scrutinty of gender discrimination); Graham v. Rich-
ardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971) (legal aliens are a suspect class).
131. See cases cited note 68 supra; see generally J. ELY, supra note 80, at 148-49.
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tion; only Justice Rehnquist prefers a race-bound interpretation.13 2
Despite its technical departure from recent precedent, Plyler is consistent
with the Court's construction of the modern equal protection clause. Indeed,
there is an unmistakable resemblance between Plyler and Brown. In Plyler,
the Texas statute was designed to relegate the children of illegal aliens to a
discrete social subclass. In Brown, the state sought to reinforce the social in-
feriority of black children by maintaining segregated schools. In each case, the
Court found that the purposeful exclusion of children from the mainstream of
society contravened the constitutional guarantee of equal treatment.
133
Plyler also effectively answers the charge that the Court's exercise of ju-
dicial review is undemocratic. In accordance with the Founders' design, it is
the Court's role to maintain the delicate balance between the government and
the people by protecting politically powerless minorities from the tyranny of
the majority. 13 In exercising this role, the Court should examine legislative
classifications with special attention to three factors. First, the Court should
ask whether the adversely affected group is an historical victim of popular
prejudice and abuse.135 Second, the Court should determine whether the legis-
lative classification is intentionally designed to inflict inequality on a disfa-
vored class,1 38 or whether the resulting inequity is merely incidental to a legiti-
mate state purpose.1 37 Third, the Court should require that the adversely
132. See, e.g., Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973) (8-1 decision). Despite its
judicial conservatism, the Burger Court has retained the view that the equal protection clause
vests relatively broad authority in the federal courts to control the states. The general language in
the fourteenth amendment evinces a congressional intent that the amendment serve as a flexible
check on state action. See J. ELY, supra note 80, at 30, 149. Compare U.S. CONST. amend. XV
(limited to race, color, and conditions of servitude). The context in which the fourteenth amend-
ment was ratified also suggests an intent to limit state power so future regional rebellions would
be prevented. See Brennan, supra note 50, at 394. There is evidence that the Framers intended
that the courts exercise more stringent control over the states than over the federal government.
Compare Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731 (1982) (President absolutely immune from civil dam-
ages liability) and United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166 (1974) (article III confers no power
for Court to evaluate national secrecy act) with Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974) (gover-
nor entitled only to qualified immunity from civil damages liablity) and Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S.
186 (1962) (political question doctrine does not prevent judicial review of state legislative election
apportionment scheme).
133. Brown's reasoning has equal force in Plyler. Both cases halted state action which
would have impressed upon schoolchidren "a feeling of inferiority as to their status in the commu-
nity that may affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone." Brown, 347 U.S.
at 494.
134. See Powell, What Really Goes on at the Supreme Court, 66 A.B.A. J. 721, 723
(1980).
135. See J. ELY, supra note 80, at 153; see generally G. ALLPORT, THE NATURE OF
PREJUDICE (1954). Where prejudice is a factor, legislative decisions are more likely to be based on
a desire to harm a disfavored group rather than to promote general welfare. Although not every
law which disadvantages a minority group must be invalidated, a "more searching judicial in-
quiry" is demanded. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co. 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938).
136. See Department of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973) ("bare congres-
sional desire to harm a politically unpopular group [hippies] cannot constitute a legitimate gov-
ernmental interest" in denying them food stamps); see generally J. ELY, supra note 80, at 134-54.
137. E.g., San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973); see J. ELY,
supra note 80, at 155-59.
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affected class has no recourse through the political process. 138 This approach
focuses on the procedural fairness of legislative processes without second-
guessing the substantive legislative decisions. 13 Centuries of experience have
provided the judicial branch with a special expertise for evaluating procedural
justice.140 This accumulated experience and its politically detached perspective
render the Supreme Court uniquely qualified to invalidate legislation predi-
cated on prejudice.1 41
Conversely, when constitutional claims fall beyond the judiciary's special
institutional competence, the Court must exercise restraint. 42 For example, it
is improper for the Court to declare broad substantive rights in the manner of
a legislative body. 143 Nor is it appropriate for the Court to act as a general
overseer of governmental affairs. Rather, the Court's essential responsibility is
to vindicate the guarantee of equal protection without impairing democratic
principles.144
Viewed in this context, Plyler v. Doe represents an affirmation of the judi-
ciary's duty to defend the powerless. The Texas legislature had targeted a dis-
crete class of resident undocumented children to endure the disability of illiter-
acy. Plyler presented the three model elements of an equal protection
violation-prejudice, transparent intent to discriminate, and impossibility of
political recourse. 145 The statute was invalidated because it was fundamentally
oppressive and unjust. Although the case surely involved a result-oriented ap-
proach, it did not necessitate resort to some "seemingly neutral judicial doc-
trine"'' 46 as a facade; the decision stands quite ably under the equal protection
clause. Plyler does not mark the demise of traditional two-tier analysis. It does
138. Federal judicial intervention was designed as a last resort, to be invoked only when
minorities are frustrated at the ballot box. See THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (J. Madison); see, e.g.,
Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 667 (1966) (poll tax invalid).
139. See J. ELY, supra note 80, at 157, 166-67.
140. See id. at 121.
141. See id. at 145-47. But see Karst, The Costs of Motive-Centered Inquiry, 15 SAN Di-
EGO L. REv. 1163, 1165 (1978).
142. See San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 58 (1973).
143. E.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). Broad substantive declarations inevitably
occasion unseemly retreats in future cases. See, e.g., Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980);
Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977).
144. Justice Powell has defined the centrist position on the scope of the judiciary's
authority:
The irreplaceable value of the power articulated by Chief Justice Marshall lies in the
protection it has afforded the constitutional rights and liberties of individual citizens
and minority groups against oppressive or discriminatory governmental action. It is this
role, not some amorphous general supervision of the operations of government, that has
maintained public esteem for the federal courts and has permitted the peaceful coexis-
tence of the countermajoritarian implications of judicial review and the democratic
principles upon which our Federal Government in the final analysis rests.
United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 192 (1974) (Powell, J., concurring).
145. See notes 22-28 and accompanying text supra.
146. The Supreme Court, 1981 Term, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1, 140 (1982) (political question
or preemption would have been more suitable grounds for deciding Plyler).
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reveal, however, that the Supreme Court remains a court of justice, and not
merely a court of law.
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